Gibb Lecture #2: "ʿAbduh's Metaphysics in Context"
Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, November 5, 2015
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1) Two texts by ʿAbduh
2) Ījī's lemma, and Dawānī's three groups
3) Avicenna's two distinctions, and Rāzī's new formula
4) Two old theories of the divine attributes
5) Three commentaries by Ḥillī
6) Existence: how univocal?
7) The triumphant sect (al-firqah al-nājiyah)

Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1323/1905)

1) *Risālat al-Tawḥīd (Essay on [Divine] Oneness)*
2) *al-Ḥāshiyah ʿalā Sharḥ ad-Dawānī ʿalā l-ʿAqāʾid al-ʿAḍudiyyah (Supercommentary on ad-Dawānī's Commentary*
     on the Creed of ʿAḍud [ad-Dīn al-Ījī])

What is knowable may be divided into three categories: the inherently possible, the inherently necessary, and the inherently impossible. The impossible is defined as that which, in and of itself, possesses non-existence. The necessary is that which, in and of itself, possesses existence. The possible is that which, in and of itself, possesses neither existence or non-existence; instead, it exists only on account of whatever makes it exist, and it does not exist only on account of the non-existence of the cause of its existence, so necessity and impossibility may attach to it on account of some other thing.

[ʿAbduh, *Risālat al-Tawḥīd* (Cairo, 1906), 18,7-11]

Ījī's lemma *(matn)*

[...the world has a Maker, eternal,] who has always been and will always be, <u>necessary of existence in Himself,</u> and impossible of non-existence in respect of Himself...

[Ījī, *ʿAqāʾid*: ed. S. Dunyā, *ash-Shaykh Muḥammad ʿAbduh bayna l-falāsifah wa-l-kalāmiyyīn* (Cairo, 1958), #75, 244,1]

Dawānī's three groups

1) *al-jumhūr min al-mutakallimīn (the generality of mutakallims)*
     God's essence <u>is sufficient for</u>/<u>is a complete cause of</u> His existence
2a) *baʿḍ al-muḥaqqiqīn min al-mutakallimīn (some of the verifiers among the mutakallims)*
2b) *al-ḥukamāʾ/al-falāsifah (philosophers)*
     God's essence <u>is identical to</u> His existence

Avicenna's two distinctions

1) essence (*māhiyyah*) vs. existence (*wujūd*)

2) a being that is intrinsically necessary (*wājib al-wujūd bi-dhātihi*) vs. a being that is extrinsically necessary/intrinsically possible (*wājib al-wujūd bi-ghayrihi/mumkin al-wujūd bi-dhātihi*)

Rāzī's new formula

Avicenna: a) existence *is entailed (lāzim)* by essence

               b) existence *is related (muḍāf)* to essence

               c) existence *is a concomitant (lāḥiq)* of essence

               d) existence *attaches accidentally (ʿ-r-ḍ)* to essence

Bahmanyār: e) existence *is extrinsic (khārij)* to essence

Rāzī: f) existence *is superadded (zāʾid)* to essence

Two old theories of the divine attributes

Classical Muʿtazilism (Abū l-Hudhayl): The divine attributes (*ṣifāt*) are identical to the divine self (*dhāt*). ("God is knowing through <u>a knowledge that is identical to Him</u>")

Classical Kullābism (Ibn Kullāb): The divine attributes (*ṣifāt*) are neither identical to nor other than the divine self (*dhāt*). ("God is knowing through <u>a knowledge that He possesses and which subsists through [or "with"] Him</u>")

Jamāl ad-Dīn "al-ʿAllāmah" al-Ḥillī

1) *Kashf al-Khifāʾ min Kitāb al-Shifāʾ (Casting off the Covering from [Avicenna's] <u>Healing</u>)*

2) *al-Muḥākamāt bayna Shurrāḥ al-Ishārāt (Arbitrations between the Commentators on [Avicenna's] <u>Pointers</u>)*

3) *Kashf al-Murād fī Sharḥ Tajrīd al-Iʿtiqād (Uncovering the Desired Meaning in Commenting on [Ṭūsī's] <u>Outline of Belief</u>)*

Existence: how univocal?

Rāzī: commonality of existence (*mushārakat al-wujūd*)

        equivocity (*al-ishtirāk al-lafẓī*)

        univocity (*al-ishtirāk al-maʿnawī*)

            a) "hard" univocity (*al-ishtirāk al-maʿnawī bi-t-tawāṭuʾ*)

            b) "soft" univocity (*al-ishtirāk al-maʿnawī bi-t-tashkīk*)

The triumphant sect (*al-firqah al-nājiyah*)

"My community will split up (*sataftariqu ummatī*) into 73 sects; all except one will be in the Fire."